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Humans often face binary cognitive-control dilemmas, with the choice between 
persistence and flexibility being a crucial one. Tackling these dilemmas requires 
metacontrol, i.e., the control of the current cognitive-control policy. As predicted from 
functional, psychometric, neuroscientific, and modeling approaches, interindividual 
variability in metacontrol biases towards persistence or flexibility could be demonstrated 
in metacontrol-sensitive tasks. These biases covary systematically with genetic 
predispositions regarding mesofrontal and nigrostriatal dopaminergic functioning and the 
individualistic or collectivistic nature of the cultural background. However, there is also 
evidence for mood- and meditation-induced intraindividual variability (with negative 
mood and focused-attention meditation being associated with a bias towards persistence, 
and positive mood and open-monitoring meditation being associated with a bias towards 
flexibility), suggesting that genetic and cultural factors do not determine metacontrol 
settings entirely. We suggest a theoretical framework that explains how genetic 
predisposition and cultural learning can lead to the implementation of metacontrol 





COGNITIVE CONTROL AND METACONTROL 
Human behavior is characterized by its considerable flexibility, which in contrast 
to other species, and other primates, allows behavioral adjustments without extensive 
training and practice. The processes that are thought to be responsible for this flexibility 
are commonly referred to as cognitive-control processes or executive functions (e.g., 
Diamond, 2013). While there is no agreed-upon inventory of human cognitive control 
processes, a particularly popular set of functions has been suggested by Friedman, 
Miyake, and colleagues (Miyake et al., 2000; Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Based on 
latent-factor techniques, these authors originally suggested distinguishing between 
inhibition (e.g., to inhibit incorrect responses), updating (e.g., to keep the content of 
working memory up to date), and shifting (e.g., to switch between different task sets), 
which they showed to go beyond generic factors like perceptual speed or intelligence 
(Friedman et al., 2006). However, a later study suggested that at least one of these 
functions (inhibition) is perfectly correlated with a common factor shared by all 
considered functions, which might imply that inhibition is an emerging property of the 
interaction between different functions, rather than a separable function itself (Friedman 
et al., 2008). 
Other approaches have used functional considerations to identify factors involved 
in cognitive control. Goschke (2003) has argued that humans are often facing control 
dilemmas that are likely to require continuous adjustments of the interplay between 
antagonistic control systems. He discusses three of such dilemmas: (a) the plasticity-
stability dilemma (should one rely on available habits or construct a new action plan on 
the fly?); (b) the maintenance-switching dilemma (should one stick with one’s current 
intention or give it up for a better opportunity?); and (c) the selection-monitoring dilemma 
(should one focus on relevant information only or consider irrelevant, but possibly 
4 
 
interesting information as well?), and points out that they all imply a fundamental 
dilemma between persistence and flexibility of control and behavior. While this dilemma 
does not map Friedman and Miyake’s two or three control factors in a one-to-one fashion, 
it is obvious that these factors would be likely to play a key role in regulating persistence 
and flexibility. 
A similar scenario of cognitive control as emerging from the interplay of two 
antagonistic systems or factors has been developed by Cools (2006, 2008; Cools & 
D’Esposito, 2011). According to this scenario, brain areas involved in cognitive control 
are fueled by two separable dopaminergic pathways: one originates in the ventral 
tegmental area and targets the prefrontal cortex (the mesofrontal pathway), and the other 
originates in the substantia nigra and targets the striatum (the nigrostriatal pathway). How 
well that assumption fits with the approaches of Friedman and Miyake, and of Goschke, 
becomes clear if one considers the known contributions of the prefrontal cortex and the 
striatum to cognitive control. The prefrontal cortex is known to house the key working 
memory functions, which are crucial for maintaining action goals and other information 
over time (Durstewitz, Seamans & Sejnowski, 2000), while the striatum is essential for 
regulating the updating of working memory content by new incoming information (Cools 
& D’Esposito, 2011) and for interrupting ongoing control in the case of situational 
changes (Frank, Samanta, Moustafa & Sherman, 2007). 
Dopamine can drive cognitive processes only if and where it reaches 
dopaminergic receptors. The modeling-based approach of Durstewitz and Seamans 
(2008) focuses on these receptors and their distribution in prefrontal cortex, which 
according to their suggestion can assume two different control states. One state is driven 
by the dominance of dopaminergic receptors of the D1 family, which in turn supports 
cognitive maintenance, while the other state is driven by the dominance of D2 receptors, 
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which is assumed to support mental flexibility. Cognitive control can thus be biased 
towards maintenance or flexibility by making either D1 receptors or D2 receptors more 
dominant. It is interesting to consider that D1 receptors by far outnumber D2 receptors in 
the prefrontal cortex, while the opposite holds for the striatum (Beaulieu & Gainetdinov, 
2011; Camps, Kelly, & Palacios, 1990). This can be taken to imply that a stronger activity 
of the ventral tegmental area would be likely to activate more D1 receptors while a 
stronger activity of the substantia nigra would activate more D2 receptors, so that the 
approaches of Cools and D’Esposito (2011) and of Durstewitz and Seamans (2008) can 
be considered very similar if not functionally equivalent. 
To summarize, there are psychometric, functional, neural, and computational 
reasons to assume that cognitive control does not reflect the operation of a unitary 
function but rather emerges from the interplay of probably two antagonistic systems or 
components. Of particular importance for our present aims, the relationship and balance 
between these systems does not seem to be fixed but variable to at least some degree. This 
means that the control style of a given individual can differ from that of another, but also 
from one situation to another. In other words, there should be intraindividual and 
interindividual variability in control styles. More specifically, the way a given individual 
exerts control operations in a given situation can be biased either towards persistence (of 
goals, preferences, working-memory content, etc.) or towards flexibility. Hence, it might 
be possible to control cognitive control to some degree, an ability that Hommel (2015) 
referred to as metacontrol. We adopt this label to refer to the ability to adopt different 
control styles in the face of different tasks, challenges, or other kinds of impact (cf., 
Boureau, Sokol-Hessner & Daw, 2015). In the following, we will assume that metacontrol 
styles vary on one single dimension ranging from extreme persistence to extreme 
flexibility, but we will discuss the possible existence of other binary dimensions, 
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including speed-accuracy, intentional-automatic, and exploitation-exploration, at the end 
of this article.  
The aim of the present article is to discuss whether and how metacontrol settings 
can be shared, that is, whether metacontrol settings can be transferred from one human to 
another and how this might be achieved. Given the emphasis of this special issue on 
instruction, the most efficient technique to share metacontrol settings would be to instruct 
another person to adopt a particular metacontrol policy. That this is possible in principle 
is suggested by research on speed-accuracy trade-offs. As we will explain at the end of 
this article, optimizing the speed or the accuracy of one’s performance can be considered 
to represent a metacontrol policy, and it has been shown that such policies can be reliably 
induced by means of instruction (e.g., Vickers & Packer, 1982). While we argue that the 
speed-accuracy dimension may well be related to the persistence-flexibility dimension 
we will be focusing on in the following, we are not aware of any study that has attempted 
to instruct individuals to be persistent or flexible directly. What we therefore will do is to 
consider various more indirect and less immediate “instructions”, that is, ways in which 
the social context (culture, peers, situational cues) guides individuals towards adopting 
particular metacontrol policies—the social transmission of metacontrol. 
One reason why direct instruction may indeed be more difficult than in the speed-
accuracy case relates to semantics. While instructing individuals to be as fast or as 
accurately as possible defines clear-cut criteria that do not leave space for interpretation, 
that is not applied to persistence and flexibility. The persistence of Super-Mario to reach 
his ultimate goal requires substantial flexibility on the way, and (as we will see in the 
following) being set for flexibility in the sense we are using the term is often accompanied 
by distractibility, a lack of inhibition, and other phenomena that are considered much less 
positive as the term flexibility might imply. Along the same lines, one might consider 
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flexibility in the Wisconsin Card Sorting task, for instance, a means to be particularly 
goal-persistent. Such interpretational ambiguities are unavoidable when using concepts 
from everyday language, and even the most comprehensive definition will not exhaust or 
replace the semantic overhead that such use necessarily brings with it (Hommel & 
Colzato, 2015). Later in this article, we will provide a mechanistic operationalization of 
persistence and flexibility that will help to reduce interpretational uncertainty. In the 
meantime, we invite the reader to tentatively interpret persistence and flexibility with 
respect to the impact of the current goal on selection processes in a broader sense, so that 
persistence stands for a strong top-down influence of the current goal on the selection of 
cognitive units (e.g., stimulus interpretations, response representations, tasks) while 
flexibility stands for a greater autonomy of the inter-unit interactions and more room for 
bottom-up influences. 
The existence of interindividual variability in metacontrol is a necessary 
requirement for sharing, because without such variability sharing would be superfluous. 
The same is true for intraindividual variability. Even if people would differ in metacontrol 
settings, but the settings would be so permanent that changing them is impossible, sharing 
should not work. That these kinds of variability exist is not obvious, given the claim of 
Friedman et al. (2008) that human cognitive-control functions are almost entirely 
genetically determined. If that would really be the case, intraindividual variability would 
be exclusively explained by genetic variability, and cultural and situational factors should 
have no impact on the operation, efficiency, and style of cognitive control. In the 
following, we will first discuss evidence suggesting that intraindividual variability does 
exist and that it is associated with both genetic and cultural factors. We then continue to 
discuss intraindividual variability, with a focus on mood and meditation, the factors that 
have been demonstrated to affect metacontrol settings in particularly systematic ways. 
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Then we discussed how metacontrol might work in principle, how the demonstrated 
interindividual and intraindividual differences might impact the mechanism of 
metacontrol, and in particular how culture and situational factors might bias metacontrol 
towards persistence or flexibility. We conclude by relating the persistence-flexibility 
metacontrol dimension focused on in this article to other dimensions that have been 
discussed in the literature, and by pointing out open questions that call for further 
research. 
INTERINDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY IN METACONTROL  
Genetics 
Evidence for interindividual variability comes from behavioral genetics studies of 
polymorphisms that are known to be related to dopaminergic processing in the 
mesofrontal and the nigrostriatal pathway. COMT Val158Met affects the efficiency of 
frontal dopaminergic processing (Chen et al., 2004) and DRD2 C957T the level of striatal 
dopamine (Hirvonen et al., 2009a, 2009b). As polymorphisms of these genes seem to 
affect the relative efficiency of either the frontal or striatal dopaminergic pathway, or D1 
or D2 receptors dominating the frontal and striatal pathway, respectively, one would 
expect that carriers of different polymorphisms differ with respect to their control style, 
especially in tasks that require persistence or flexibility. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the available key findings. 
 
*** TABLE 1 *** 
 
Indeed, carriers of different polymorphisms of the COMT Val158Met gene were 
shown to differ in their efficiency to switch between tasks (Colzato, Waszak, 
Nieuwenhuis, Posthuma, & Hommel, 2010a). More specifically, carriers of a 
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polymorphism that can be assumed to increase the dominance of the frontal dopaminergic 
system (i.e., Met- carriers) were shown to have greater difficulties in task switching then 
carriers of other polymorphisms. In another study, the same gene was found to predict the 
degree to which people benefit from playing video games. In particular, carriers of a 
polymorphism that increases the dominance of the striatal dopaminergic system (Val/Val) 
showed more pronounced transfer from videogame training to task switching in a 
laboratory setting (Colzato, van den Wildenberg, & Hommel, 2014). In a reversal learning 
task, Val/Val homozygotes exhibited worse performance than Met/Met homozygotes at 
the acquisition stage but outperformed them at the reversal stage (Nolan, Bilder, 
Lachman, & Volavka, 2004), suggesting that their genetic predisposition impairs 
cognitive stability but enhances cognitive flexibility. Moreover, in a Stroop task with 
different levels of required cognitive stability and flexibility, Rosa et al. (2010) found 
Met/-carriers to show better performance when cognitive flexibility was required.  
Genes with a stronger impact on striatal/D2 processing were also found to have 
an impact on relative persistence/flexibility. For instance, carriers of the T/T 
polymorphism of the DRD2 C957T gene perform better than carriers of other 
polymorphisms in a verbal working memory task (Jacobsen, Pugh, Menci, & Gelernter, 
2006) and an attentional blink task (Colzato et al., 2011), but exhibit more dysfunctional 
impulsivity and less efficient inhibition in a stop-signal task (Colzato, van den 
Wildenberg, van der Does & Hommel, 2010b), and a less effective, more parallel action 
cascading strategy (Stock, Arning, Epplen & Beste, 2014).  
Another interesting gene to highlight the striatal/D2 processing is the 
DRD2/ANKK1 Taq Ia polymorphism. Carriers of at least one A1 allele (A1+) have a 
30% reduced striatal receptor density as compared with carriers of the homozygous 
A2/A2 (A1-) variant (Ritchie & Noble, 2003). Stelzel et al. (2010) reported significantly 
10 
 
reduced task-switching costs in carriers of the A1+ variant and, along the same line, 
Markett et al. (2011) found that DRD2 A1+ carriers displayed a larger backward 
inhibition effect (in a task that is taken to diagnose a control mechanism that contributes 
to cognitive flexibility by reducing proactive interference by no longer relevant task sets). 
On the one hand, these behavioral genetics studies provide preliminary evidence 
that dopamine-related interindividual differences are related to differences in metacontrol 
by creating systematic biases towards more persistence or more flexibility—a proof of 
principle. Moreover, the outcomes of these studies fit with findings using spontaneous 
eyeblink rates as indicators of individual (presumably nigrostriatal) dopamine levels (see 
Jongkees & Colzato, 2016 for a recent review). For instance, individuals with high blink 
rates showed increased cognitive flexibility but decreased cognitive persistence 
(Dreisbach et al., 2005; Tharp & Pickering, 2011), while individuals with low blink rates 
showed a deeper attentional blink (Colzato, Slagter, Spapé & Hommel, 2008a). 
On the other hand, however, there are at least two reasons to treat these findings 
with caution. First, there is increasing concern regarding replicability in genetic studies, 
not the least because the often very small effects would actually call for much larger 
samples than most behavioral genetics studies have tested. We emphasize that the cited 
studies differ from most other genetics studies in that they were guided by a systematic 
theoretical framework and relatively specific hypotheses, but it is nevertheless true that 
more replication studies are needed. Second, it is commonly easier to predict that carriers 
of different polymorphisms of candidate gene should differ in performance on a particular 
task than to predict the direction of this effect. Theoretically speaking, one might expect 
that polymorphisms that reduce the efficiency of the frontal or D1-based dopaminergic 
system should shift the balance between persistence and flexibility towards the latter, 
while polymorphisms that reduce the efficiency of the striatal or D2-based dopaminergic 
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system should have the opposite effect. Likewise, one might expect that increasing the 
efficiency of the frontal/D1-based system would lead to more persistence while 
increasing the efficiency of the striatal/D2-based system would lead to more flexibility. 
Unfortunately, however, the current insight into the impact of genes on neuromodulation 
is too limited to predict exactly which polymorphisms impair and which polymorphisms 
improve processing in a given system. One key problem is that there are reasons to 
assume that the function relating dopamine levels to efficiency is not linear but follows 
an inverted U-shape (Cools, 2006; Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). Hence, even if it would 
be possible to predict whether a given polymorphism leads to a relative increase or 
decrease of the individual dopamine level in a particular pathway (which given that 
polymorphisms can affect various factors including receptor sensitivity, binding, 
dopaminergic production and transport is very difficult already), it is currently impossible 
to determine theoretically the level or processing characteristic that allows for the most 
efficient handling of a particular task. This in turn makes it very hard to predict whether 
an increase in dopamine moves an individual towards the optimal level (and thus 
improves performance) or away from that level (and thus impairs performance). 
A final point of interest is that genetic effects are commonly asymmetric, in the 
sense that a given gene may affect persistence but not flexibility, or vice versa. For 
instance, Rosa et al. (2010) did find a COMT-Met advantage for tasks requiring cognitive 
stability, but they did not find a Val advantage for tasks requiring cognitive flexibility. 
As we will elaborate below, this might suggest that genetic effects targeting dopaminergic 
pathways do not directly impact the metacontrol setting but rather the neural machinery 
realizing this setting. This means that an impairment to realize flexibility based on 
limitations of the underlying dopaminergic pathway or receptor system need not prevent 




There are plenty of studies on various aspects of how culture (a concept that we 
will use broadly to refer to the impact of particular groups of individuals; see Heine, 2008) 
affects human cognition in general, but studies focusing on the impact of culture on 
cognitive control processes are relatively rare. One of the reasons is that cultural studies 
are commonly more interested in the self-assessment of individuals (e.g., the perception 
of personal control: Rothbaum, Weisz & Snyder, 1982; Ji, Peng & Nisbett, 2000) than in 
their objective functioning and the processing underlying it. Another reason is that the 
conceptualization of human cognition in cultural studies tends to be less informed by 
mechanistic considerations than more lower-level cognitive or neuroscientific 
approaches, so that aspects of what might actually be considered to be related to cognitive 
control is often discussed as perception, attention, or thinking. However, as we will argue, 
some of the findings discussed under these headings do seem to relate to cognitive control 
styles as defined in the present article, which is why we nevertheless consider some of 
these studies. Table 2 provides an overview of the key factors being tested and the key 
findings regarding metacontrol. 
 
**** Table 2 **** 
 
Nationality/ethnicity 
Studies in cultural psychology are often following the practice of comparing 
individuals from different countries that can be considered to differ in cultural 
background, and indeed, if the concept of culture merely refers to groups of individuals, 
a country can certainly be considered to represent such a group. And yet, nationality and 
citizenship are increasingly problematic criteria to define culture in a time of rather 
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extreme mobility and globalization. Moreover, the comparison of countries often 
confounds other factors that, as we will see in the case of religion, seem to be at least just 
as potent. These caveats aside, a rather well-developed research line has systematically 
explored the cognitive differences between US-Americans and Japanese, which are 
commonly taken to reflect the impact of individualism and collectivism, respectively 
(e.g., Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). From a societal point of view, individualism and 
collectivism refer to the degree to which a social system holds either the individual or all 
in-group members responsible for each given person, including this person’s behavior 
and well-being. Systematic research on international differences in norms, regulations, 
values, and procedures have resulted in the construction of a country-specific 
individualism scale, that is part of Hofstede’s widely accepted cultural dimensions 
framework (https://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html; Hofstede, Hofstede & 
Minkov, 2010). From a individual point of view, the individualism-collectivism 
dichotomy has been translated into the degree to which individuals construct their social 
self as either independent from others or as socially interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). Among other things, individuals with an independent self would experience their 
identities and consider their behavioral control independent from others and their 
relationships with them, while individuals with an interdependent self would more 
strongly rely on social relationships in defining themselves and identifying appropriate 
behavior.  
Comparisons of US-Americans and Japanese have revealed a number of well-
replicated outcome patterns that are important for our discussion. When processing visual 
displays, US-Americans have a stronger preference for focusing on foreground objects 
than Japanese have, while Japanese process more background information than US-
Americans (Nisbett and Masuda, 2003). This tendency remains rather stable or even 
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becomes stronger over inspection time (Masuda et al., 2008) and affects retrieval as well, 
as shown by better recognition in Japanese, but not in US-Americans, when focal objects 
were presented later with the original rather than a novel background (Masuda & Nisbett, 
2001). These observations fit with findings showing that Japanese participants perform 
more poorly than US-Americans in the Rod and Frame test, which requires the 
dissociation of foreground object and visual context (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura & 
Larsen, 2003). These and many related findings (for a brief overview, see Heine, 2008: 
Chapter 9) suggest that US-Americans focus more on the most salient, and presumably 
most relevant information of visual displays than Japanese participants do, and these 
observations have been taken to imply an analytic versus holistic processing style, 
respectively. With respect to control styles, this can be taken to imply that US-Americans 
have a stronger bias towards persistence (the control style inducing an analytic processing 
mode) than Japanese have and/or Japanese participants have a stronger bias towards 
flexibility (the control style inducing a holistic processing mode) than US-Americans 
have (see the section on mechanisms for a more detailed explanation how 
persistence/flexibility leads to specific processing modes). 
These observations confirm the prediction of systematic intraindividual variability 
and control styles. However, the setup of the discussed studies does not allow ruling out 
a number of other factors, including the possibility of specific genetic differences between 
the average US-American and the average Japanese. Moreover, the USA cannot be 
considered particularly homogeneous with respect to various aspects of culture, an 
argument that increasingly applies to other countries as well. Even more problematic is 
the suggestion that comparisons between US-Americans and Japanese come down to a 
comparison of individualism and collectivism. While the United States are the top scorer 
worldwide in Hofstede’s scale of country-specific individualism (https://geert-
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hofstede.com/national-culture.html), Japan is the top scorer of East Asian countries, with 
a score that is about three times as high as that of, say, Taiwan or Indonesia. That does 
not seem to make the mindsets of Japanese individuals particularly representative of 
collectivism. Fortunately, there is evidence that the reported Western-Eastern differences 
can be replicated with samples from other countries. For instance, Caucasian Australians 
were found to show equal performance for global and local levels of multi-level stimuli 
(large letters made of small letters: Navon, 1977), while both second-generation Asian 
Australians and Asians from Hong Kong, mainland China, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Korea showed much better performance for global than for local levels 
(McKone et al., 2010). While the lack of a global-preference effect in the Caucasians 
amounts to a non-replication of the frequently reported Navon (1977) effect, this study 
provides at least some evidence for generalization across countries. Finally, the USA with 
its strong emphasis of a Protestant ethic differs systematically from Japan in terms of 
religion which, as we will see, has a systematic impact on metacontrol. 
Religion 
As do nationalities, religions show considerable differences with respect to the 
degree of individualism and collectivism, and the amount of individual independence 
versus interdependence they advocate. Dutch neo-Calvinism is an extreme example. This 
version of Protestantism was developed by Dutch statesman and theologian Abraham 
Kuyper in the late 1800s (Bratt, 1998) and soon adopted as part of the Dutch national 
identity, as evident from the fact that neo-Calvinism has been adopted as the official 
ideology of a political party, a trade union, a newspaper, a university and many schools. 
Importantly for our purposes, neo-Calvinism is based on the concept of sphere 
sovereignty, which emphasizes that each societal sphere or sector has its own 
responsibilities and authorities, and stands equal to other spheres. This concept has 
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penetrated Dutch culture and caused a considerable segregation of Dutch society (often 
called pillarization). Applied to everyday life, it has established the idea that, in a nutshell, 
everyone should mind his or her own business, which among other things has led to a 
relatively liberal policy regarding abortion, drug use, and euthanasia in the Netherlands, 
but also been exported by Dutch emigrants to South Africa as the ideological basis for 
apartheid (Boesak, 1984). Neo-Calvinism and the sphere sovereignty concept are 
considered a major component of economic progress in the Netherlands and the extreme 
degree of individualism (the country occupies the fourth rank worldwide of Hofstede’s 
individualism scale, after the US, Australia and the UK). As another extreme, Buddhism 
advocates a particularly strong form of collectivism. One of its core doctrines, Anatta, 
denies the existence of a separate self in the sense of a permanent, integral, autonomous 
being within an individual existence. Key advocates of this approach, as the Dalai Lama 
(2007), consider what people think about their self, their personality and ego, as 
temporary creations, if not delusions (a claim that is surprisingly similar to the perceptual-
bundle approach of David Hume, 1739). Practicing Buddhism is accordingly aimed to 
overcome any reminding barriers between self and other. “To forget the self”, Zen Master 
Dogen (1976) writes, “is to be enlightened by all things, to be enlightened by all things is 
to remove the barriers between oneself and others”. From this perspective, it is 
unsurprising that countries with a strong Buddhist tradition, like Taiwan, are scoring 
particularly low on the Hofstede individualism scale (17/120, as compared to 80/120 for 
the Netherlands). 
If one assumes that being exposed to a particular religion create similar kinds of 
biases as reported for nationality/ethnicity, one would expect that religions advocating 
individualism should be associated with a stronger bias towards persistence (or a less 
pronounced bias towards flexibility) than religions advocating collectivism (Hommel & 
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Colzato, 2010). Indeed, Dutch neo-Calvinists showed a less pronounced global-
preference effect (i.e., faster responses to the global than to the local level of multi-level 
stimuli; Navon, 1977) than Dutch atheists matched for race, intelligence, education, sex, 
and age (Colzato, van den Wildenberg & Hommel, 2008b). This observation is still 
consistent with Nisbett and Miyamoto’s (2005) suggestion that it is the individualistic vs. 
collectivistic nature of the cultural background that matters (Cohen & Hill, 2007), but it 
suggests that it might well be religion or ideology, rather than nationality or ethnicity, that 
is providing that background. 
A major conceptual problem of many studies on the impact of cultural factors on 
the processing of global and local aspects of visual information is that the tasks being 
tested can be interpreted as conflict tasks. For instance, multi-level stimuli, like the often 
used Navon letters (i.e., large letters made of small letters: Navon, 1977), are likely to 
create an attentional and/or decision-making conflict, as the global and the local elements 
commonly imply different responses. Given that attentional resources are limited, the 
same can be assumed for complex visual displays with a focal object and a rather rich 
background, as used in many intercultural studies (see Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Nisbett 
& Miyamoto, 2005; Heinen, 2008, Chapter 9). Dealing with conflict is effortful 
(Botvinick, 2007), which may be taken to imply that more balanced performance profiles, 
such as more equivalent performance on global and local aspects of a display, simply 
reflects higher motivation (i.e., invested effort). While this may still be an interesting 
effect that even bears some connection to cognitive control in a wider sense, it would not 
necessarily be as specific as we and other researchers have suggested. This problem is 
particularly pressing with respect to the finding on religious orientation. There is ample 
evidence that religiousness as such is associated with reduced conflict between goals and 
increased self-monitoring and regulation (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009), suggesting 
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that engaging in any kind of religion improves performance on any task involving 
selection. 
The first part of this implication was tested by comparing Dutch neo-Calvinists 
with matched Dutch atheists on the one hand and Italian Roman Catholics with matched 
Italian atheists (or seculars, as confessing atheists are difficult to find in Italy) on the other 
on Navon’s multi-level task (Colzato et al., 2010c). Given that Roman Catholicism puts 
strong emphasis on collectivistic values and the social interdependence of appropriate 
behavior (e.g., John Paul II, 1987), the expectation was that this should lead to an 
increased, rather than a decreased global-precedence effect. The comparison between 
Dutch neo-Calvinists and Dutch atheists replicated the findings of Colzato et al. (2008b) 
by showing that the neo-Calvinists performed more equally in the global and the local 
task; in other words, they showed a less pronounced global-precedence effect than the 
atheists. The study also tested more liberal Calvinists and baptized atheists (i.e., 
individuals that were raised as conservative neo-Calvinists but no longer believed or 
engaged in religious practice), and it turned out that the liberal Calvinists fell in between 
the more conservative neo-Calvinists and the atheists, while the performance of the 
baptized atheists was indistinguishable from that of the neo-Calvinists. This suggests that 
the effect is rather sticky and does not depend on continuous religious practice. Even more 
importantly, the Italian Catholics showed the exact opposite effect as the neo-Calvinists, 
namely, a much stronger global-precedence effect than the Italian seculars. This rules out 
the possibility that religiousness per se is responsible for moderating the global-local 
effect, it rather seems to be the specific faith and, presumably, the degree of individualism 
or collectivism it implies. This latter assumption was reinforced by the fact that Colzato 
et al. (2010c) were able to replicate the increased global-precedence effect obtained for 
the Roman Catholics in Israeli Orthodox Jews (a population that also emphasizes 
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collectivistic values: Ichilov, 2005; Sagy, Orr, & Bar-On, 1999) as compared to Israeli 
seculars. Further support comes from another replication of the increased global-
precedence effect in Taiwanese Zen Buddhists as compared to matched Taiwanese 
atheists (Colzato, Hommel, van den Wildenberg & Hsieh, 2010d). 
All the studies on religion we have considered so far may be taken to imply that 
individualistic religions lead to better performance than collectivistic religions, but there 
is evidence speaking against that interpretation. Given that the multi-level task induces 
conflict, a more selective focus should be beneficial. In terms of metacontrol, this implies 
that greater persistence (rather than flexibility) would lead to more balanced performance 
and, hence, to a smaller global-precedence effect. If it is correct that individualistic 
ideology or religion lead to greater persistence, as we would argue, it makes sense that 
people with an individualistic cultural background perform better. But other tasks are 
conceivable, tasks in which performance benefits from less persistence and more 
flexibility. This was the rationale of Colzato, Hommel, and Shapiro (2010e), who 
compared Dutch neo-Calvinists and matched Dutch atheists in an attentional blink task. 
This task requires the report of two targets presented within a rapidly presented visual 
stimulus stream (for reviews, see Dux & Marois, 2009; Hommel et al., 2006). While the 
first target is commonly reported accurately, the second is often missed if it follows the 
first after an only short lag—the attentional blink. Of particular interest, there are reasons 
to assume that this effect reflects the inefficient distribution of attentional resources: most 
or all resources are allocated to the processing of the first target, so that too little is left 
for the second (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Shapiro et al., 2006). With respect to 
metacontrol, this translates into a problem of too much persistence: focusing too much on 
one event at a time should reduce performance in this task, while more flexibility should 
be helpful. If so, one would expect that neo-Calvinists show a stronger attentional blink: 
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as compared to atheists, their bias towards persistence should lead to a more exclusive 
allocation of attentional resources to the first target, which would make them more likely 
to miss the second. This is indeed what Colzato et al. (2010e) found. The main theoretical 
implication is that neither religiousness in general nor engaging in an individualistic 
religion necessarily improves performance. Rather, individualistic religions are 
associated with a stronger bias towards persistence, which can improve performance in 
tasks that benefit from persistence but impair performance in tasks that benefit from 
flexibility; collectivistic religions in turn are associated with a stronger bias towards 
flexibility, which can improve performance in task that benefit from flexibility but impair 
performance in tasks that benefit from persistence. 
Let us now consider in some more detail how persistence might improve 
performance in persistence-heavy tasks. Conflict tasks with multi-level stimuli might 
benefit from persistence by increasing the selectivity of information processing. Higher 
persistence would thus allow to exclude irrelevant information more efficiently, which 
would allow to better exclude global information when responding to local stimuli and 
vice versa. As the global-precedence effect is mainly due to the difficulty to exclude 
global information when responding to local stimuli (Navon, 1977), more efficient 
exclusion of irrelevant information would tend to make responding to local and to global 
stimuli equally efficient, which in turn would tend to reduce the global-precedence effect. 
The same reasoning could be applied to the observation that Taiwanese Buddhists take 
more notice of other people’s actions then matched Taiwanese atheists do (Colzato et al. 
2012). But an alternative interpretation is possible. Rather than affecting the weighting 
and selection of relevant vs. irrelevant information, an individualistic religion may merely 
be associated with a smaller attentional focus. Processing the global aspects of a multi-
level stimulus arguably requires a larger focus than processing a single stimulus at the 
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local level, and it is possible that zooming-in on local stimuli is easier for members of 
individualistic religions or ideologies. This may even account for the impact of religion 
on the attentional blink, if we only assume that attentional foci can move in both space 
and time: members of individualistic religions may also have a smaller temporal focus, 
which might impair their ability to process two consecutive events.  
Testing between the selectivity and the focus account requires a task in which 
having a smaller spatial or temporal focus does not improve performance. These criteria 
apply to the Simon task, which was used by Hommel et al. (2011). The Simon task 
requires participants to carry out spatial responses to a non-spatial feature of a stimulus 
that is randomly presented on the left or right of some reference point. If the stimulus 
location happens to coincide with the location of the correct response, performance is 
better than if that is not the case (Simon & Rudell, 1967)—an outcome pattern that is 
referred to as the Simon effect (Hommel, 2011). As predicted by the selectivity account, 
but not by the focus account, the Simon effect was smaller in Dutch neo-Calvinists than 
in matched Dutch atheists, and larger in Italian Roman Catholics than in matched Italian 
seculars (Hommel et al., 2011). These findings suggest that religion is associated with a 
degree of selectivity to which relevant information is processed. The findings do not 
necessarily exclude the possibility that religion also impacts the spatial or temporal focus, 
but they do not require this assumption. 
Another comparison provides some more insight into how interindividual 
differences in cognitive control may affect inhibition-related processes. On the one hand, 
religion was found to be systematically related to performance in a temporal discounting 
task (Paglieri et al., 2013). In particular, Dutch neo-Calvinists were more willing to wait 
for monetary rewards than both Italian Roman Catholics and Dutch atheists, and Italian 
Catholics were less tolerant of delay than either Dutch Calvinists or Italian seculars. To 
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the degree that patience in a temporal discounting task reflects the inhibition of immediate 
reward-consuming tendencies (Kirby & Marakovic, 1996), this pattern suggests that neo-
Calvinism is associated with increased, and Catholicism with reduced inhibitory abilities. 
On the other hand, however, no differences between Dutch neo-Calvinists and Dutch 
atheists, or between Italian Roman Catholics and Italian seculars were obtained in a stop-
signal task (Hommel et al., 2011). As we will argue below (see section on mechanisms), 
this suggests that religion does not operate on dedicated inhibitory systems but on control 
functions that can generate inhibition as a byproduct. Note that this implication fits well 
with the psychrometric observation that inhibition does not seem to be a separable stand-
alone factor (Friedman et al., 2008). 
Sexual orientation 
Both nationality and religious belief are just two indicators of interpersonal 
segregation and group-formation, which represent the key constituents of cultural systems 
(Heine, 2010). Sexual orientation is another indicator, especially for individuals with less 
common orientations. Interestingly, there is evidence that sexual orientation has an 
impact on metacontrol. It has often been suggested that homosexuals have a kind of “sixth 
sense” for recognizing the sexual orientation of others, especially of other homosexuals—
an ability referred to as gaydar (Shelp, 2002). Scientific research confirmed the existence 
of this ability, at least under some circumstances. In particular, Ambady, Hallahan, and 
Conner (1999) observed that homosexuals are more accurate than heterosexuals in 
detecting the sexual orientation of unfamiliar others in pictures and brief video clips, but 
this benefit goes away when the video clips are longer. This suggests that it is not the 
knowledge about orientation-relevant perceptual cues that makes the difference, but the 
speed at which these cues can be extracted from brief presentations. Considering the 
findings on local versus global processing, and the idea that a high degree of persistence 
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might increase the focus on relevant information, which in turn would reduce the global-
precedence effect, Colzato, van Hooidonk, van den Wildenberg, Harinck, and Hommel 
(2010f) tested the possibility that homosexuals have a stronger bias towards persistence. 
If they would, homosexuals should exhibit a less pronounced global-precedence effect 
than heterosexuals. Colzato et al. tested this possibility by comparing homosexuals and 
heterosexuals, matched in terms of race, intelligence, sex, mood, age, personality, 
religious background, educational style, and socio-economic situation, in a Navon-style 
multi-stimulus task. As predicted, homosexuals showed a significantly smaller 
precedence effect, which means that they showed less difficulty than heterosexuals in 
processing details. 
INTRAINDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY IN METACONTROL  
Mood 
At least two research lines have tested the possibility, and provided evidence that 
mood—or the functional or neural state underlying it—entertains an intimate link to 
metacontrol. For one, positive mood is suspected to promote loose thinking and efficient 
brainstorming (Ashby, Isen & Turken, 1999), and many studies have indeed reported that 
divergent thinking benefits from positive-mood induction (Baas et al., 2008; Isen, 1999). 
Both neuroscientific (Ashby et al., 1999) and functional (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel & 
Baas, 2010) considerations suggest that positive-going mood (and the underlying increase 
of dopaminergic levels) creates a less focused, more flexible control state that allows for 
a less constrained flow of information and the consideration of information that is only 
vaguely associated with task-relevant objects. As typical divergent-thinking tasks, like 
the Alternate Uses Task that requires participants to identify as many uses of a simple 
object as they can think of, benefit from a lack of constraints, it makes sense that positive 
mood improves performance in such tasks. From a metacontrol perspective, these 
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findings suggest that the induction of positive mood leads to a shift of the assumed 
balance between persistence and flexibility towards the latter, which in turn provides 
evidence that this balance can change within minutes, if not seconds. 
For another, mood induction has been reported to have a systematic impact on 
attentional selectivity. For instance, Dreisbach & Goschke (2004) induced no, positive, 
or negative affect before having participants perform in a task-switching experiment. 
Positive affect enhanced cognitive flexibility and reduced perseveration, but also 
increased distractibility by irrelevant information, suggesting that shifted metacontrol 
towards flexibility. Along the same lines, Müller et al. (2007) presented participants with 
prospective monetary gains in a set-shifting task. Interestingly, the impact of gains on 
persistence and flexibility was modulated by the subjective evaluation of the reward cues: 
participants who reported increasing their effort in response to reward cues showed 
increased cognitive stability, while participants who reported a positive, relaxed attitude 
towards reward cues showed increased flexibility. Similarly, under dual-task conditions, 
performance on the primary task is less affected by information related to the secondary 
task after induction of negative mood (Zwosta, Hommel, Goschke & Fischer, 2013). 
A related research line has considered mood as an important (Botvinick, 2007) if 
not necessary (Inzlicht, Bartholow & Hirsh, 2015) internal cue to trigger control 
adjustments. Several cognitive tasks are diagnostic with respect to the degree to which 
participants are able to exclude task-irrelevant information, with the Stroop task 
(MacLeod, 1991), the Simon task (Hommel, 2011), and the flanker task (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974) being the most prominent among them. The effects of these tasks 
consistently indicate that people are not able and/or willing to exclude irrelevant 
information entirely, so that performance is impaired if irrelevant stimulus information 
suggests or promotes an incorrect response. Interestingly, however, the size of these 
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effects can differ from trial to trial: e.g., the effect of irrelevant flankers is more 
pronounced after compatible trials (i.e., trials in which the irrelevant flanker indicated the 
same response as the relevant target) than after incompatible trials (i.e., trials in which 
the flanker indicated an incorrect response; Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 1992). This result 
pattern, which has been replicated for other conflict tasks as well, has been taken to reflect 
control adjustments triggered by conflict (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 
2001; Egner, 2007; Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). Later versions of this account have 
emphasized the role of affective states (Botvinick, 2007), the assumption being that 
conflict induces negative affect, which in turn may be the trigger to focus more on the 
task and the relevant information. In other words, negative affect might shift metacontrol 
towards more persistence, which fits with Dreisbach and Goschke’s (2004) claim that 
positive affect shifts metacontrol towards more flexibility. 
A number of findings are consistent with the idea that trial-to-trial control 
adjustments can be moderated by affect. For instance, these adjustments are reduced or 
even eliminated after trials that are followed by monetary gains (van Steenbergen, Band 
& Hommel, 2009, 2012a) and when the task is performed after induction of positive mood 
(van Steenbergen, Band & Hommel, 2010), and increased in remitted depressive patients 
after acute tryptophan depletion (van Steenbergen et al., 2012b). On the one hand, it is 
important to point out that these findings do not necessarily require the assumption that 
emotional experience and subjective affect play a causal role in control adjustment. In 
fact, establishing a subjective affective experience is arguably taking so much time that 
an intervening role in trial-to-trial adjustments does not seem plausible. Moreover, there 
is no reason to believe that concepts referring to subjective experience do not overlap in 
terms of their underlying neural or functional mechanisms (Hommel & Colzato, 2015), 
suggesting that emotion and affect may not be a factor in cognitive control but rather the 
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experience thereof (Hommel, Moors, Sander & Deonna, in press). On the other hand, 
however, the available findings strongly suggest that affective states are systematically 
associated with signals that trigger shifts in metacontrol towards persistence (such as 
negative mood) or flexibility (such as positive mood). Given the key role of dopaminergic 
state-changes in the processing of reward (Schultz, 2000) and the establishment of mood 
states (Ashby et al., 1999), as well as the key role of dopaminergic pathways in cognitive 
control, this should not come as a surprise but rather as converging evidence that the 
concept of self-control and emotion might indeed represent different sides of the same 
coin. 
Meditation 
Many meditation practices include active efforts to train cognitive abilities that 
obviously relate to attention and cognitive control in a wider sense. According to Lutz, 
Slagter, Dunne, and Davidson (2008), most techniques can be sorted into two categories: 
focused-attention meditations that are coaching the meditator to better focus on a single 
thought or event and to avoid any sort of distraction, and open-monitoring meditations 
that are teaching the meditator to open up and accept any possible upcoming thought. 
Brief consideration reveals an obvious resemblance of this pair of techniques to the two 
metacontrol states under discussion—persistence and flexibility, respectively. Some 
studies have investigated whether extensive meditation training affects control processes, 
and attentional control in particular (for a review, see Lippelt, Hommel & Colzato, 2014). 
But, more importantly for our purposes, there is also evidence that only briefly engaging 
in meditation has a systematic impact on metacontrol. For instance, in both practitioners 
and novices, brief bouts of open-monitoring meditation substantially improved divergent 
thinking without having impact on convergent thinking, while brief bouts of focused-
attention meditation tended to have the opposite effect (Colzato, Ozturk & Hommel, 
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2012; Colzato, Szapora, Lippelt & Hommel, in press). This suggests that engaging in 
open-monitoring meditation promotes metacontrol bias that is useful for finding as many 
suitable solutions to a vaguely defined problem as possible (which is how divergent 
thinking is operationalized) while focused-attention meditation promotes a bias that is 
useful for finding the only possible solution to a well-defined problem (which is how 
convergent thinking is operationalized)—a description that clearly implies flexibility and 
persistence, respectively. This scenario also fits with the observation that engaging in 
convergent thinking increases task shielding and reduces shifting flexibility in a dual task 
situation (Fischer & Hommel, 2012), an outcome that parallels the findings of Dreisbach 
and Goschke (2004) for negative mood induction. 
Along the same lines, brief bouts of open-monitoring meditation produced a 
significantly smaller attentional blink in meditation novices than engaging in focused-
attention meditation (Colzato, Sellaro, Samara, Baas & Hommel, 2015), confirming the 
prediction that open-monitoring meditation promotes a less temporally-focused allocation 
of attentional resources. While open-monitoring meditation facilitates performance in 
tasks that rely on flexibility, it also impairs performance in tasks that rely on persistence. 
Notably, open-monitoring meditation, as compared to focused-attention meditation, 
reduced trial-to-trial adjustments in a Simon task (Colzato, Sellaro, Samara & Hommel, 
2015). 
MECHANISMS OF METACONTROL SHARING 
Findings from behavioral genetics and from cultural studies have demonstrated 
the existence of systematic intraindividual differences with respect to indicators of 
metacontrol biases. The complexity of dopaminergic interactions underlying control 
processes is not yet sufficiently understood to allow for directed predictions under many 
circumstances, but there are clear proofs of principle that polymorphisms of genes 
28 
 
impacting frontal and striatal dopaminergic processing are associated with systematic 
outcome patterns in tasks tapping into metacontrol. Cultural studies suggest systematic 
relationships between the individualistic versus collectivistic nature of the dominant 
national ideology or religious orientation on the one hand and systematic biases of 
metacontrol towards persistence and flexibility, respectively, on the other. We note that 
neither behavioral genetics nor cultural studies allow for a causal interpretation of the 
available observations. Both research lines are correlational in nature, which makes it 
difficult or impossible to exclude the impact of other, merely correlated factors. It is also 
possible that what has been considered cultural effects are actually genetic in nature, as 
people with particular metacontrol tendencies might prefer some religions or subcultures 
over others. And, conversely, given the often very homogeneous populations investigated 
in genetics studies, what looks like genetic effects may actually reflect cultural impact. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that cognitive control is not a uniform functional given but a 
system that shows systematic variability that is associated with dopaminergic functioning 
and cultural differences. This fits with from studies on the impact of mood, affect, and 
meditation on cognitive control, which provide substantial evidence that metacontrol 
settings are not fixed but variable to at least some degree. Importantly, this implies that 
the factors responsible for the interindividual variability in metacontrol settings we have 
discussed do not account for all individual differences, but space is left for situational and 
state-dependent effects. This fulfills our second criterion for the transfer of metacontrol 
to make sense, as it means that individuals are able to change their metacontrol biases 
according to external signals and communication with others.  
But how does metacontrol work? Given the apparent reliance of metacontrol, and 
the balance between persistence and flexibility in particular, on dopamine, a 
neuromodulator that very broadly impacts the how but not the what of control, a 
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mechanistic model of metacontrol must not be content- or domain-specific. Hence, 
metacontrol is unlikely to have a direct impact on how control operations implement and 
fine-tune perceptual, attentional, and action processes to carry out a particular task but it 
would rather be expected to moderate the processing style reflected by these processes. 
As we have suggested elsewhere (Colzato et al., 2010c; Hommel, 2015), a 
mechanistic model would need to consider the basic architecture of human decision-
making. According to the critical review of Bogacz (2007), increasing neuroscientific 
insights favor competitive decision-making models over passive evidence-collecting 
models. In particular, biologically plausible models need to assume that the evidence 
collected for one given alternative is related and compared to the evidence collected for 
other alternatives in a winner-takes-all fashion. As shown in the cartoon version of such 
a model in Figure 1A, competitive decision-making can be considered as the competition 
of representations of possible alternatives for selection. The representation of a given 
alternative would increase in strength as a function of the available evidence supporting 
it (e.g., the representation of one response increases as more evidence is available that the 
stimulus it is mapped on was presented), which in turn would not only increase the 
probability that it is finally selected (and the corresponding actions carried out) but also 
inhibit the representation of other alternatives (the representation of the other response, 
say). As compared to a passive evidence-selection model, such a competitive model 
would speed up decision-making, as the activation difference between given alternatives 
would be a function of both the available evidence for each representation and the 
available evidence for each alternative. While competitiveness refers to the relationship 
between decision-making alternatives, the second key ingredient of biologically plausible 
decision-making models is the fact that competition is biased by goal states (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995). Accordingly, the probability of a given alternative to be selected does not 
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only depend on the evidence supporting it but also on the degree to which it fits with 
current intentions and goals of the decision-maker. In the figure, this is indicated by goal 
states favoring one (or more) of the available alternatives, but it is just as possible that 
various alternatives are supported by goal states in a more graded fashion; for instance, 
grasping a cup of water with the dominant and the non-dominant hand would both be 
supported by the goal to quench one’s thirst, but the less effortful dominant-hand action 
might receive stronger support because it uses fewer resources (cf., Rosenbaum et al., 
1995). 
Figure 1: Schematic model of metacontrol. (A) Metacontrol is assumed to affect 
two parameters: the degree of competition between decision-making alternatives and the 
degree to which this competition is biased by the current goal. (B) Extreme persistence is 
characterized by strong competition and top-down bias. (C) Extreme flexibility is 
characterized by weak competition and top-down bias. 
 
If we can thus assume that the basic architecture of human decision-making is 
characterized by competitiveness and top-down bias, as indicated in the figure, we need 
to ask how metacontrol might influence processes using such an architecture. Given that 
metacontrol is unlikely to operate on specific content, it is unlikely to relate to the 
representations of alternatives or the goals that provide top-down input. Rather, 
metacontrol is likely to moderate the degree to which competition and top-down bias are 
taking place (Hommel, 2015). An extreme degree of persistence can be assumed to 
strengthen the degree to which goal states bias decision-making and/or the degree of 
31 
 
competition between alternatives (in the absence of diagnostic evidence, we will not 
distinguish between these possibilities; for a broader discussion see Hommel, 2015), as 
sketched in Figure 1B. In contrast, an extreme degree of flexibility would strongly reduce 
the impact of goal states and/or the degree of competition, as sketched in Figure 1C. 
Following Hommel (2015), we will refer to this scenario as the Metacontrol State Model 
(MSM). Let us now consider how such a model would account for the outcome patterns 
reviewed so far, before we discuss some necessary extensions. 
We have seen that interindividual variability in metacontrol biases is associated 
with the genetic setup and the cultural background of individuals. At first sight, this may 
be surprising given the evidence that what Friedman, Miyake and colleagues have 
identified as the three core components of cognitive control (updating, shifting, and 
inhibition) are almost entirely predicted by genetics (Friedman et al., 2008). It is true that 
the genetic effects on metacontrol are often very, very small and accounting for just a few 
percent of performance. However, this must be seen in light of the fact that the tasks that 
are used to assess cognitive control are not process-pure, which means that only a few 
percent of the performance are actually reflecting cognitive control. Accordingly, the 
small effects of genetic studies may actually capture a substantial portion of cognitive 
control. Moreover, many more genes than have been investigated so far may contribute 
to cognitive control, so that future insights into the human genome may increase the 
variability accounted for by genetic differences. The extraordinarily large samples needed 
for meaningful genetic analyses commonly prohibit the investigation of interactions 
between genes, it may be these interactions that account for the lion’s share of control-
related variability. Finally, it is certainly possible that the genetic setup and the cultural 
background are not independent. There may well be systematic genetic differences 
between different populations, be they defined by nationality, religion, sexual orientation, 
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or any other way. In that sense, finding systematic effects of both genetics and culture 
does not need to be a contradiction, even if the contribution of one of these factors is 
considered very high. At the same time, however, it is also true that most genetic studies, 
and in particular the one by Friedman et al. (2008), were conducted with very 
homogeneous samples. While many data referring to the cultural background are not 
reported, it seems very likely that the participants shared many more characteristics and 
environmental influences than, say, US Americans and Japanese. This implies that the 
available genetic studies may drastically underestimate contributions from cultural 
factors, including religious conviction, values, and other metacontrol-relevant aspects. 
For the time being, we in any case do not consider reported high percentages of 
genetically predicted variability and a strong impact of culture as contradictory. 
Genetics 
With respect to possible genetic influences, we hesitate to directly relate the 
functional implications of metacontrol biases to specific neural or neuromodular 
processes. As we have pointed out, it is difficult to say which exact level of dopamine in 
the frontal pathway is necessary to promote optimal performance in a persistence-heavy 
task, whether and how that level depends on the exact level in the nigrostriatal pathway, 
whether it is the tonic or the phasic level that is more important, how tonic and phasic 
levels interact, and so forth and so on. It also remains unclear whether and to what degree 
the two relevant dopaminergic pathways interact. While their activity is driven by 
different sources, the ventral tegmentum and the substantia nigra, these sources are 
notoriously difficult to segregate and delineate in humans (e.g., Chowdhury, Lambert, 
Dolan & Düzel, 2013). This raises the possibility that their control is synchronized to 
some degree or perhaps even that the two pathways are controlled by the same input or 
system. And yet, note that the genes we have considered, and even a number of other 
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factors, were shown to impact metacontrol in an asymmetric fashion. That is, an 
impairment of persistence does not necessarily lead to more flexibility, and vice versa, 
suggesting that the components that realize the balance between persistence and 
flexibility are not fully integrated but are autonomous to some degree.  
In other words, while persistence and flexibility may be considered opposite poles 
on a single dimension at a (meta)control level (at which a shift towards persistence 
necessarily implies a shift away from flexibility, and vice versa), these control settings 
still need to be translated into contributions from partly independent systems. It is the 
interaction of these systems from which the actual balance between persistence and 
flexibility emerges, and these emerging properties may be less binary and symmetric than 
the original settings. The relationship between the input and the effect of metacontrol 
settings can thus be considered to be similar to steering a car: while the steering wheel 
regulates direction on a single left-right dimension, blocking the wheels to go right does 
not make the car turning left. Nevertheless, the available findings suggest that particular 
kinds of dopaminergically-relevant genetic setups promote persistence and/or impair 
flexibility, while other setups have the opposite effect. In our cartoon model, this would 
suggest that some setups are associated with a configuration that tends more towards the 
extreme shown in Figure 1B while other setups are associated with a configuration that 
tends more towards the extreme shown in Figure 1C.  
If so, this would be expected to affect performance in an attentional blink task as 
sketched in Figure 2. A persistence-biased metacontrol configuration would make 
attention rather selective. That would be true for both space and time, but it is time that 
matters in the attentional blink task. If the first of two targets appears (T1), it would 
receive strong top-down bias from the goal representation, which in this task can be 
considered to hold templates of possible targets. The support would lead to a strong 
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suppression of other events, which in the case of a quickly succeeding second target (T2) 
would lead to a strong inhibition of its representation. This would make missing the 
second target more likely, which in turn implies a stronger attentional blink. Stronger 
blinks were found indeed for carriers of polymorphisms that are assumed to be associated 
with a less effective striatal dopaminergic pathway (Colzato et al., 2011) and in 
individuals with relatively low spontaneous eyeblink rates (Colzato et al., 2008a), which 
is likely to reflect nigrostriatal functioning. A less extreme focus on the first target would 
be more efficient in this task, which is what the findings show and what the 
overinvestment account of the attentional blink (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Shapiro 
et al., 2006) has suggested. 
The same genetic setup would be expected to have negative consequences in tasks 
that are more selective and less inclusive in nature, and so it is not surprising that the 
genetic setup that allows for better performance in the attentional blink task is also 
associated with a greater tendency towards dysfunctional impulsivity (Colzato et al., 
2010b). It is also of interest that our account has implications that relate to inhibition 
without including a dedicated inhibitory mechanism (cf., Munakata, Herd, Chatham, 
Depue, Banich, & O'Reilly, 2011). Note that a persistence-biased configuration would 
have more severe consequences for the decided-against alternative than a flexibility-
biased configuration, as explained in our attentional blink scenario. Inhibition would thus 
be a byproduct of persistence and focusing, and impulsivity a byproduct of flexibility, 
which would fit with the assumption of Friedman et al. (2008) that their inhibition factor 







Figure 2: Scenarios illustrating how persistence or flexibility biases might affect 
performance in the Attentional Blink task, the Simon task, convergent thinking in the 
Remote Association Task, and divergent thinking in the Alternate Uses Task. 
Constraining goal representations are shown in rectangles and competing decision-
making alternatives in circles (the two targets in the Attentional Blink task, the two 
response alternatives in the Simon task, or the verbal responses in the convergent and 
divergent thinking tasks). Note that a persistence bias is characterized by strong goal 
impact and strong mutual inhibition, while a flexibility bias is characterized by weak goal 
impact and weak mutual inhibition. 
 
Culture 
To account for the impact of culture on metacontrol, MSM applies the same 
reasoning as suggested for understanding the impact of genetics. Indeed, it is easy to 
imagine that particular kinds of cultural backgrounds are associated with particular biases. 
For instance, engaging in individualistic religions like neo-Calvinism may generate a bias 
towards persistence, while engaging in collectivistic religions like Catholicism, Judaism, 
or Buddhism may generate a bias towards flexibility. As a consequence, one would expect 
that members of individualistic religions tend to focus strongly on relevant information 
while members of collectivistic religions would integrate more nominally irrelevant 
information. This accounts for the observed attentional differences between US-
Americans and Japanese, but also for the observation that neo-Calvinists show a smaller 
Simon effect but a larger attentional blink, while Catholics show the exact opposite 
pattern. As indicated in Figure 2, more persistent metacontrol would impair performance 
in the attentional blink task, due to an over-investment of resources into the first target, 
which leads to a greater neglect of the second. As also indicated, persistent metacontrol 
would improve performance in the Simon task, however. This task induces response 
conflict (in incompatible trials) by presenting stimuli at a location that corresponds to the 
incorrect response, which has been shown to activate this response’s representation 
(Sommer, Leuthold & Hermanutz, 1993). As the figure indicates, this creates a conflict 
between the correct response, which is activated by the translation of the relevant stimulus 
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attribute (such as color or shape) according to the instructed stimulus-response rules, and 
the incorrect response activated by stimulus location. More persistent metacontrol would 
reduce this conflict and facilitate its resolution by increasing the impact of the relevant 
stimulus information and increasing the inhibition that the representation of the correct 
response can exert on the representation of the incorrect response. Hence, the correct 
response will receive less interference and be more efficient in outcompeting alternatives. 
This would be expected to reduce the Simon effect in members of cultures that induce a 
persistence bias—such as neo-Calvinists, which is indeed what the data show. 
So, the eventual mechanism that is responsible for cultural effects is easy to 
envision but its emergence is less obvious. How is it possible that, say, neo-Calvinism 
creates a persistence bias? In the following, we will develop a theoretical scenario that 
accounts for the impact of cultural factors on metacontrol. As we will explain, this 
scenario relies on MSM, to which we add three assumptions (or two, as the first was 
implied by the first version already): (a) metacontrol states have a perceivable impact on 
behavior; (b) culturally appropriate behavior generates positive feedback; and (c) positive 
feedback reinforces both the behavior and the underlying metacontrol state, and thus 
makes their future occurrence more probable. 
To account for any impact of cultural factors on metacontrol states, or in fact any 
internal state, one needs to assume that these internal states can be made visible to the 
social environment (as claimed by our first assumption), so that this environment can 
provide selective (positive or negative) feedback (as required by our second assumption). 
Feedback requires criteria and these criteria must not refer to unobservable internal states 
but to observable behavior. For metacontrol states to be affected by social feedback, they 
therefore must generate specific kinds of observable behavior, as sketched in Figure 3. 
More specifically, particular metacontrol states must generate particular kinds of behavior 
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that are sufficiently distinguishable from behaviors that are generated by other 
metacontrol states. If thus metacontrol state X generates behavior A, and metacontrol 
state Y generates behavior B, A and B must be sufficiently distinguishable for the social 
environment to react differently to them.  
We are not aware of any study that has directly tackled that issue but we do not 
consider this assumption particularly far-fetched either. Take, for instance, the way 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures are characterized by Hofstede et al. (2010). 
Members of individualistic cultures are assumed to look after themselves and their 
immediate family members only, to communicate more explicitly, and to rely on personal 
values. Members of collectivistic cultures, in contrast, are assumed to belong to in-groups 
that look after them in exchange for loyalty, to communicate more implicitly, and to rely 
on values based on their social network (Wursten & Jacobs, 2014). Consider what that 
implies for day-to-day behavior. Members of individualistic cultures would need to focus 
on much less information, on much fewer persons, on much fewer personal cues, which 
in comparison to members of collectivistic cultures would allow them to concentrate 
much more on salient events and communication channels. Such cultural differences are 
likely to be related to observable behavioral differences. For instance, a conforming 
member of an individualistic culture would show more coherent behavior, less variability 
related to switching between different informational sources, rely more on talking rather 
than body signals, and so forth. As we have argued, efficiently engaging in such behaviors 
would benefit from a metacontrol bias towards persistence, while the behavior expected 
from a member of a collectivistic culture would show the opposite characteristics and 
would thus benefit from a stronger metacontrol bias towards flexibility. As people will 
tend to establish a metacontrol state that makes their behavior more efficient, this suggests 
that increasing efficiency is accompanied by an increasingly specific one-to-one mapping 
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between metacontrol states and particular kinds of behavior.   
 
 
Figure 3: A mechanism of acquiring metacontrol state preferences through social 
feedback. The present metacontrol state is assumed to determine the current balance 
between persistence and flexibility, as indicated by the black arrow on the gray scale. 
This balance has an impact on the characteristics of action plans, which in turn translate 
into overt behavior that receives positive or negative feedback, including social feedback 
that reflects the conformity of the behavior with the cultural norms and values. Repeated 
sharing of positive feedback leads to the integration of metacontrol states and actions. 
 
Establishing a one-to-one mapping between behavior and the underlying 
metacontrol state implies the frequent co-occurrence of behavior and state, which in turn 
implies that behavior and state are exposed to the same kind of social feedback. 
Accordingly, social approval of the behavior will often take place at a time the 
corresponding metacontrol state is active. Applying a simple Hebbian learning rule (what 
fires together wires together) would mean that social approval reinforces both behavior 
and metacontrol state, which can be assumed to make their future reappearance more 
likely (as suggested by our third assumption). The more behaviors are associated with a 
particular metacontrol state, the more often it will be reestablished, which implies a 
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particularly frequent occurrence of metacontrol states that generate culturally conforming 
behaviors. If our assumption that particular cultural norms and values, such as expressed 
by a particular religion, often imply similar or identical metacontrol states, this would 
mean that these particular states would be very frequent and dominant in everyday life. It 
makes sense to assume that this is likely to lead to the chronification of the respective 
state and make it the default.  
Having established a default metacontrol setting may have a stabilizing function 
and improve subjective well-being. Not having a default creates uncertainty regarding the 
optimal metacontrol setting, which implies conflict between alternative options. Given 
that conflict is associated with negative affect and the motivation to actively reduce it 
(Botvinick, 2007), this means that creating a default is likely to improve well-being. Most 
of the laboratory tasks we have considered so far may benefit from, but do not require 
one specific metacontrol state, which implies that the interindividual differences we have 
discussed reflect people’s chronified default settings. 
Situational effects 
As we have discussed, metacontrol states are not only related to rather long-lasting 
factors like genetics or cultural impact, but they also vary as a function of situational 
circumstances, such as mood or meditation. While these factors are likely to leave less 
permanent traces than genetics and culture, there is no reason why the temporary 
metacontrol biases they induce should impact performance in metacontrol-sensitive tasks 
in any other way than longer-lasting biases do. For instance, assuming that negative mood 
and focused-attention meditation tend to induce a persistence bias while positive mood 
and open-monitoring meditation tend to induce a flexibility bias, the impact of these 
biases on creative thinking, the best-documented effect of these factors, can be explained 
as shown in Figure 2. Convergent thinking, as operationalized by the Remote Association 
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Task (Mednick & Mednick, 1967), can be characterized as finding a highly constrained 
search for one single possible solution. The example uses a common item of this task 
(which word can go with “Glue”, “Man”, and “Market”?), for which “Super” is the correct 
answer. A persistence bias is likely to support this search as strong support for the 
alternative that fits the search criteria and a strong inhibition of alternatives that do not 
(e.g., other associates of the three search words) would be expected to speed up finding 
the right solution. A flexibility bias, however, would not be helpful, as this would not 
provide the needed guidance for the search process. Divergent thinking, as 
operationalized by the Alternate Uses Task (Guilford, 1967), can be characterized as 
finding a vaguely constrained search for as many solutions as possible. The example uses 
a common item of this task (what you can you do with a pen?), and it shows some of 
many possible solutions. It is obvious that a persistence bias would not be helpful in this 
task, as it would speed up identifying the first possible item (“Write”, in the example) but, 
as this would lead to a strong inhibition of all other alternatives, it would take more time 
to reactivate these inhibited alternatives when searching for a second item. A flexibility 
bias, in turn, would reduce that problem and allow to rapidly considering and reporting 
various possibilities. 
The evidence for intraindividual variability triggered by mood manipulations and 
meditation suggests that the acquisition of long-lasting default settings does not prevent 
situational metacontrol adjustments. One possibility would be that defaults are effective 
only in situations where no specific metacontrol setting is required, but can be overwritten 
by situational factors. Another possibility is that defaults demarcate a range of preferred 
or dominant metacontrol states, which can be modified but act as a kind of reference 
point. If so, positive mood and open-monitoring meditation, say, would tend to shift 
metacontrol towards flexibility irrespective of the default value, but the short-term effect 
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in the long-term bias would operate on metacontrol in an additive fashion, so that the 
interindividual difference would still exist. Preliminary evidence for this possibility was 
provided by Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2012), who induced positive mood in 
participants before they performed a divergent-thinking task. Positive-going mood 
increased the individual eyeblink rates (a marker of striatal dopamine), as one would 
expect, but only individuals with low blink rates improved in divergent thinking. 
Considering that medium blink rates are associated with best performance in divergent 
thinking (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010), this suggests that positive mood 
induction increases striatal dopamine levels in everyone, and probably to the same degree, 
but whether this is advantageous depends on the original level (i.e., on whether the 
increase is moving the level of this person towards or away from the optimal region). In 
other words, the actual performance seems to be predicted by the additive combination 
of long-term (tonic) in short-term (phasic) dopaminergic impact—but resolving this issue 
calls for more studies, ideally with pharmacological interventions. 
While mood and meditation can both be considered situational factors (given the 
evidence that meditation novices and practitioners do not differ in metacontrol-sensitive 
tasks), they are likely to affect metacontrol in different ways. Given the dopaminergic 
implications and effects of mood changes, it seems plausible that mood does not 
necessarily change the metacontrol setting itself but rather moderates the resulting 
balance between frontal and striatal dopaminergic pathways. Meditation, in contrast, is 
likely to promote particular metacontrol states directly. In fact, the entire concept of 
meditation can be considered as a training technique developed to establish particular 
metacontrol states—a persistence-heavy state in the case of focused-attention meditation 
and a flexibility-heavy state in the case of open-monitoring meditation. Taken together, 
long-term and short-term effects on metacontrol can be conceptualized as reflecting the 
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establishment of a preferred range of metacontrol values on the persistence-flexibility 
scale indicated in Figure 3 and more short-term shifts towards persistence or flexibility 
induced by situational factors. 
There is another set of findings that calls for one more assumption however. It has 
been shown that asking Western participants to use personal pronouns, like “I”, “me”, 
and “mine” (as compared to relational pronouns like “we”, “us”, “ours”), induces a local, 
context-insensitive processing strategy (Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002) in the speaker and 
reduces the degree to which he or she considers and cognitively represents other people 
in a given situation (Colzato, de Bruijn & Hommel, 2012). This suggests that engaging 
in a more individualistic versus a more collectivistic activity tends to induce a 
corresponding shift of metacontrol towards persistence and flexibility, respectively. 
Hence, not only can a particular metacontrol state affect action planning but planning and 
performing a particular action can change the metacontrol setting. This suggests that the 
frequent co-occurrence of metacontrol states and culturally appropriate actions does not 
only lead to their joint social approval, but this in turn leads to the integration of 
metacontrol state and action, as indicated in Figure 3. Note that this integration implies 
the emergence of a self-maintaining cultural feedback loop. For instance, we have 
discussed that living in an individualistic culture will more often require explicit, verbal 
communication to express one’s needs and intentions as compared to a collectivistic 
culture. Expressing one’s needs and intentions commonly requires the use of personal 
pronouns (except if they are relational in nature, which however is less likely in an 
individualistic culture), which in turn promotes a metacontrol state that has been 
integrated with such behaviors—a persistence-heavy metacontrol setting that is, which in 
turn makes other individualistic actions more likely, and so forth. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
We have seen that genetic disposition and culture are associated with systematic 
interindividual variability in relative metacontrol biases towards persistence or flexibility. 
This means that one precondition for interpersonal sharing of metacontrol settings is 
fulfilled: if people differ in metacontrol settings, it may make sense to transfer them from 
one to another. We also have seen that situational factors can bias metacontrol towards 
persistence or flexibility, with mood and meditation being our key examples. The 
existence of interindividual variability demonstrates that the apparently rather permanent 
default settings due to genetic, cultural, or other factors do not fully determine the setting 
but leave some space for variability and, hence, for situational adjustments and sharing. 
This meets the second of our two requirements for successful sharing. 
We then suggested MSM, a model of metacontrol, which we extended to account 
for cultural learning. The model explains how genetic predisposition and cultural 
exposition might induce particular default values of metacontrol, and how these values 
might be moderated by situational factors. While the MSM serves well to integrate 
findings from various domains and research lines, we consider it still preliminary, as a 
working model that is. The reason is that a number of important questions remain 
unanswered so far, and it is not un likely that answers to these questions will change 
aspects of the model, or at least provide more detail and add quantitative precision. In the 
following, we discuss some of the most pressing questions of that sort. 
First, we have treated the metacontrol dimension as unidimensional and as ranging 
from persistence to flexibility. This decision seems to serve well for sorting most of the 
available findings, but more insight into the neural machinery underlying metacontrol 
may require more complex theorizing. We have seen some evidence that this machinery 
is partly independent, in the sense that genetic predisposition targeting the frontal 
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dopaminergic pathway may impair persistence but may leave flexibility intact, while 
genetic predisposition targeting the nigrostriatal dopaminergic pathway may have the 
opposite effect. This suggests that not all of the balance between persistence and 
flexibility may emerge from the direct opposition of these two pathways, which could 
have been one theoretical option, as this would seem to imply a more direct impact of the 
state of one pathway on the state of the other. We have suggested that the setting itself 
might be separate from the emerging balance, so that the impairment of one component 
of this balance (such as one dopaminergic pathway) need not change the metacontrol 
setting itself. However, it may well be that it is not the opposition between pathways that 
matters but rather relative contributions from different dopaminergic receptor systems, 
and it is not quite clear how that might change the interpretation of genetic effects. 
Moreover, the enormous efforts required for the investigation of interactions between 
polymorphisms of different genes will make it difficult to assess of what kind and how 
strong the impact of such interactions on metacontrol or its realization may be. 
Second, we have discussed a number of tasks that arguably are sensitive to 
metacontrol settings, in the sense that some tasks can be assumed to benefit from 
persistence while others can be assumed to benefit from flexibility. And yet, no 
psychological task can be considered process-pure. For instance, we have argued that the 
Simon task and the Remote Association Task benefit from persistence, while the 
Attentional Blink task and the Alternate Uses Task benefit from flexibility. While we 
believe that these are reasonable arguments, it is certainly true that performing the Simon 
task and the Remote Association Task involves processes and operations that call for 
some degree of flexibility: e.g., the Simon task is known to invite trial-to-trial adjustments 
(Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter & Sommer, 2002) and the Remote Association 
Task does require the systematic search through memory. Along the same lines, both the 
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Attentional Blink task and the Alternate Uses Task does require the continuous 
representation of target templates—some degree of persistence that is. More precisely 
assessing and quantifying the reliance of a task on persistence and flexibility seems useful 
but difficult to manage. This need not preclude the demonstration of proofs of principles, 
as our review demonstrates, but it will represent a challenge for developing a more 
systematic psychophysics of metacontrol. 
Third, we have discussed evidence that dopamine levels relate to performance in 
persistence- and flexibility-diagnostic tasks in an inverted U-shape fashion (Akbari 
Chermahini & Hommel, 2010; Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). This is not uncommon for 
effects related to neuromodulators or in fact for almost all neurochemical effects, but as 
long as there is no method to directly access and standardize dopamine levels, specific 
and in particular directed predictions will remain difficult to make. For instance, as long 
as it is impossible to objectively capture and describe the dopaminergic state that allows 
one given individual to show optimal performance in a particular task, it will be 
impossible to predict the exact effects of a given dopaminergic or dopamine-related 
manipulation, such as mood induction. The more systematic consideration and validation 
of diagnostic cues, such as spontaneous eyeblink rates, may help to tackle this problem. 
Finally, it remains to be seen how the persistence-flexibility dimension we have 
considered in this article relates to other dimensions that have been discussed in the 
literature. One often-investigated dimension refers to the ability of humans to regulate the 
speed vis-à-vis the accuracy of their responses. The common observation is that 
increasing speed is often possible but associated with a loss of accuracy, while the 
increase of accuracy comes with the loss of speed: the speed-accuracy trade-off. Several 
theories have been suggested (for a review, see Bogacz, Wagenmakers, Forstmann & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2010), ranging from the assumption that speed emphasis leads to the 
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priming of cortical integrators (e.g., Furman & Wang, 2008) or the increase of striatal 
activity (which results in reduced inhibition)(Forstmann et al., 2008) to the cortically 
initiated slowdown of responding through the subthalamic nucleus (Frank, Scheres & 
Sherman, 2007) or the strengthening of synapses connecting cortical integrators and 
striatal neurons (Lo & Wang, 2006). Obviously, all these options can be considered to 
relate to the balance between the prefrontal and striatal mechanisms, which we assume 
underlie the regulation of persistence and flexibility. Indeed, it is easy to imagine that a 
strong bias towards flexibility, as shown in the right panels of Figure 2, allows for fast 
responding while a strong bias towards persistence, as shown in the left panels, slows 
down responses but makes them more accurate by making sure that the outcome 
represents the goal state. Accordingly, the metacontrol state model we propose arguably 
captures a substantial part of the functional and neural mechanisms underlying speed-
accuracy trade-offs. Moreover, considering the possibility that the mechanism is 
neuromodulatory in nature, as we suggest, raises the possibility that all four of the 
available theoretical suggestions are correct. That is, changing the balance between the 
mesocortical and the nigrostriatal dopaminergic pathway may change the relative activity 
of both prefrontal and striatal systems, which in turn may systematically modulate 
subthalamic activity. That the frontal-striatal interaction becomes more effective through 
the strengthening of synaptic connections would also be a reasonable assumption. Hence, 
we consider the possibility to relate research on speed-accuracy trade-off and on the 
metacontrol of persistence and flexibility as a promising way to go. 
A second theoretical line of reasoning is related to the contrast between will and 
habit, to use the original terms, between intentional and automatic control or, to use the 
latest disguise of this conceptual distinction, between model-based and model-free action 
control (e.g., Dolan & Dayan, 2013). The commonality of all these conceptual pairs is the 
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idea that action tendencies can be driven by goals and by stimuli, so that action control 
can be considered the resolution of conflict arising whenever goals and stimuli suggest 
different actions. A standard example is the Simon effect: when intending to respond by 
pressing the left or right key in response to the red or green color of a stimulus, say, 
responses take more time when the horizontal stimulus location does not coincide with 
the response location. The idea is that this increasing reaction time reflects a conflict, or 
the time needed to resolve the conflict, between the response implied by the color (the 
intentional response tendency) and the response implied by the location of the stimulus 
(the automatic response tendency)(e.g., Kornblum, Hasbroucq & Osman, 1990). The 
metacontrol state model suggests that the degree to which goals and stimuli contribute to 
action control is dependent on the metacontrol setting, and we have discussed evidence 
showing that religion indeed determines the degree of the Simon effect. Interestingly, the 
mentioned study comparing neo-Calvinists, atheists, and Roman Catholics on the Simon 
task revealed that neo-Calvinists no longer showed a significant Simon effect (Hommel 
et al., 2011). This suggests that the presence and size of the Simon effect depends on 
metacontrol settings, which in turn fits with the observation that electrophysiological 
evidence of stimulus-induced response tendencies in the Simon task disappear if the 
stimulus is presented before the stimulus-response mapping (Valle-Inclán & Redondo, 
1998). This means that the instruction and, thus, the goal is the precondition for automatic 
tendencies to occur (Hommel, 2000). Hence, automaticity is goal-contingent (Bargh, 
1989) and, thus, not really automatic. This undermines the common distinction between 
intentional and automatic tendencies and suggests that automaticity reflects the strategic 
use of environmental information for action control rather than goal-unrelated, stimulus-
driven determination. Considering the role of metacontrol and its impact on the relative 
weight given to internally-triggered and stimulus-driven processes is likely to help 
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replacing the misleading distinction between intentional and automatic (or model-based 
and model-free) processes by a more realistic integrative model of action control. 
A third line of theorizing we would like to briefly consider is related to the 
distinction between exploitation and exploration. The underlying idea is that many 
activities are associated with a control dilemma related to the question whether one should 
continue with the present activity or switch to an alternative option. This might relate to 
foraging (should one keep searching for food in a given area or explore other areas?), 
memory (should one keep searching for a word in the present semantic category or switch 
to another one?), or goals (should one keep trying to reach the given goal or give up and 
switch to another one?)(e.g., see Hills & Dukas, 2012). Hills (2006) has reviewed 
evidence that the regulation of exploitation and exploration is strongly related to 
dopaminergic functioning in various species, perhaps in interaction with other 
neuromodulators, such as norepinephrine (Cohen, McClure & Yu, 2007; Hills, Todd & 
Goldstone, 2010). The mechanism controlling the degree of exploitation and exploration 
has been characterized as a domain-general higher-level control process that is generated 
by a network including the prefrontal cortex. The process is assumed to determine the 
degree of persistence, which relies on goal representations and working memory, and 
inhibitory processes that propagate switching to new goals (Hills et al., 2010). Note how 
well this scenario fits with the one we have suggested to account for persistence-flexibility 
control. Also of interest, evidence for the domain-generality of the control process has 
been provided by having human participants search through a visual array, in which 
resource spaces were arranged in either a clumpy or a dispersed fashion, before 
performing a Scrabble task involving a search for words that could be made from 
particular letter sets (Hills, Todd & Goldstone, 2008). It turned out that word-searching 
participants stayed longer within a given letter set before moving to the next after having 
50 
 
searched the clumpy array than after having searched the diffuse array. Moreover, within 
groups of participants, those who explored more in space also explored more across letter 
sets. Note that these findings parallel the observations from meditation studies: both the 
meditation and the search studies suggest a kind of metacontrol priming, in the sense that 
a metacontrol state established for one task seems to bias the metacontrol style in a 
succeeding task. We thus conclude that the available theorizing regarding the mechanisms 
underlying exploitation and exploration raises the possibility that this conceptual pair 
overlaps substantially or even entirely with the one we have focused on in the present 
article—persistence and flexibility. 
Taken altogether, we conclude that the extended MSM we suggest does not only 
account for various findings from genetic, culture, and behavioral studies, for reported 
effects of mood and meditation, and for the social and cultural sharing of metacontrol 
states. It may also have the potential to integrate findings from investigations on related 
conceptual pairs, including speed and accuracy, intentional and automatic processing, and 
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